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The  EU-Korea  FTA  and  its 
Implications  for  the  Future  EU-
Singapore FTA 
 
Summary 
 
In 2006, the European Union (EU) announced its intention to 
conclude a new generation of free trade agreements (FTAs) 
with strategic partners. These FTAs, primarily motivated by 
economic considerations, would aim at a high level of trade 
liberalisation. In particular, they would cover the areas which 
are  crucial  to  the  EU’s  competitiveness,  such  as  services 
liberalisation and investment promotion and protection, and 
include strong provisions to tackle non-tariff barriers in areas 
such  as  intellectual  property  rights,  public  procurement, 
regulatory  barriers  and  unfair  competition.  The  EU  also 
identified  key  partners  that  would  offer  significant 
opportunities for EU companies. ASEAN, Korea and Mercosur 
emerged as priorities in view of their market potential and 
the current level of protection against EU export interests. 
 
The first FTA that EU has concluded in Asia is the EU-Korea 
FTA, which will provisionally enter into force on 1st July 2011. 
The  EU  considers  it  the  most  “ambitious”  EU  FTA  and  is 
presented as a “benchmark” for future ones. An overview of 
the main elements of the FTA illustrates the level of ambition 
of  the  EU  in  concluding  its  new  generation  of  FTAs.  In 
particular, it provides interesting insights into what a future 
EU-Singapore FTA may look like. After negotiations between 
the EU and ASEAN were put on hold, the EU decided to enter 
into  negotiations  with  individual  ASEAN  member  states, 
starting with Singapore in December 2009. Both partners are 
currently entering the last phase of negotiations and the FTA 
may be concluded over the next few months. The final shape 
of the EU-Singapore FTA would provide a reference point for 
a  21st  century  FTA  and  for  EU’s  negotiations  with  other 
ASEAN member states, laying the foundation for the future 
of a comprehensive EU-ASEAN economic partnership.  2 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In  October  2006,  the  European  Union  (EU) 
adopted a new trade agenda and announced that 
it  would  aim  at  concluding  ambitious  and 
comprehensive  free  trade  agreements  with 
priority  partners.  Unlike  the  many  preferential 
trade agreements the EU has entered into in the 
past, the EU announced that this new generation 
of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) would be based 
primarily  on  economic  motivations  and  would 
aim at a high level of trade liberalisation.
1 
 
Implementing  the  strategy  presented  in  the 
Commission  document  on  “Global  Europe: 
Competing  in  the  World”,
2 the EU has entered 
into negotiations with several partners among 
which were Asian countries.  Using economic 
criteria such as market potential (economic size 
and growth) and  the level of protection against 
EU  export  interests  (tariffs  and  non -tariff 
barriers),  the  EU  selected  in  particular  India, 
ASEAN and Korea as partners for new FTAs in 
Asia.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 While economic criteria may factor in more heavily in 
the  new  generation  of  EU  trade  agreements,  the 
decision by the EU to enter into a trade agreement 
will  continue  to  be  based  on  broader  political 
considerations.  As  underlined  by  the  European 
Commission in the “Global Europe: Competing in the 
World” Communication, “FTA provisions should be an 
integral part of the overall relations with the country 
or region concerned”.  
See  Global  Europe:  Competing  in  the  World:  A 
Contribution  to  the  EU's  Growth  and  Jobs  Strategy. 
European  Commission  Staff  Working  Document 
COM(2006) 567 final. European Commission, p.18 
2  European  Commission  Staff  Working  Document, 
Global  Europe:  Competing  in  the  World:  A 
Contribution  to  the  EU's  Growth  and  Jobs  Strategy. 
COM(2006) 567 final. 
 
 
The first FTA to be concluded is the Korean-EU 
FTA (KOREU FTA), which was signed on 6 October 
2010.  It  is  considered  by  the  EU  as  its  most 
comprehensive  and  ambitious  FTA  and  is 
presented by the EU as a benchmark for future 
ones.
3 Examining the KOREU FTA may then give 
us an indication of what can be expected from 
the FTA that is being negotiated between the EU 
and Singapore. 
 
This background brief will begin with an overview 
of the main elements of the new EU policy on 
FTAs.  It  will  then  examine  some  of  the  key 
elements of the KOREU FTA and look in particular 
at  the  provisions  th at  may  be  of  interest  to 
Singapore.  Finally,  we  will  consider  the  EU -
Singapore FTA negotiations in light of both the 
KOREU FTA outcome and the specificities of the 
trade and investment relations between the EU 
and Singapore. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
3 European  Commission,  Commission  Staff  Working 
Document, Report on progress achieved on the Global 
Europe  strategy,  2006-2010,  COM(2010)612, 
9.11.2010, p. 7 
  4 
1.  THE  NEW  EU  POLICY  ON  FREE  TRADE 
 AGREEMENTS 
 
1.1   Evolution in the EU trade policy 
 
The  EU  was  an  “early,  major  promoter  of 
preferential  trade  agreements  (PTAs)”
4 and  has 
developed a complex set of trade relations with 
third  countries  since  the  creation  of  the 
European Economic Community in 1957.
5  
 
The EU views PTAs as an integral part of its 
bilateral relations with third countries. There is 
no EU model PTA and EU agreements appear to 
be  negotiated  flexibly  to  suit  the  EU  and  its 
partners in each specific case.
6 The content of 
these  PTAs  have  differed  among  partners  in 
terms of provisions and commitment. Some PTAs 
have  been  shaped  by  foreign/security  policy 
concerns  and  others  more  by  commercial 
considerations.
7  The  Association  agreements 
entered  into  with  the  eastern  or  so uthern 
neighbors have focused on promoting economic 
development  and  political  stability  in  the  EU’s 
                                                      
4  The  terms  PTAs  and  FTAs  are  often  used 
indistinctively  to  describe  preferential  trade 
agreements.  The  term  FTAs,  in  particular,  is  widely 
used  to  describe  all  preferential  trade  agreements 
that are not customs unions. 
“A  preferential  trade  agreement  (PTA)  is  a  trade 
agreement wherein trade barriers between partners 
are  less  than  the  barriers  facing  non  members 
whereas a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is a PTA that 
eliminates all barriers to trade between partners. In 
practice  several  FTAs  should  in  fact  more  correctly 
termed PTAs as they do not provide for completely 
free trade between partners. FTAs are also different 
from Customs Unions as members of an FTA maintain 
their own tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff barriers 
vis-à-vis  non-members.”  From  Pohl  Nielsen,  C. 
“Regional  and  Preferential  Trade  Agreements”, 
Fødevareøkonomisk Institut, Report no. 155  
5  Ahearn,  R.J.,  Europe’s  New  Trade  Agenda,  CRS 
Report for Congress, 6 December 2006, p. 2  
6 Woolcock,  S.  European  Union  policy  towards  free 
trade agreements, ECIPE Working Paper No. 3, 2007, 
p.4 
7 Ibid. 
near  neighborhood.  The  European  Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) concluded by the EU with the 
so-called  ACP  (Africa,  Caribbean  and  Pacific) 
countries
8  pursue  an  economic  development 
objective whereas commercial motivations have 
been  at  the  origin  of  the  EU  agreements 
concluded with South Africa, Chile and Mexico. It 
is noteworthy that until the definition of a new 
trade agenda by the EU, the EU PTAs have been 
characterized by relatively modest ambition in 
terms of market -opening since many of them 
were defined as development or neighborhood 
policy instruments.
9  
 
In the mid-1990s, the EU began to give priority to 
the  multilateralism  of  the  World  Trade 
Organisation (WTO) over bilateral agreements to 
reach  further  global  trade  liberalisation.  In 
particular, the EU advocated the inclusion of new 
issues such as investment, services, intellectual 
property rights and competition policy known as 
the  “Singapore  issues”
10 in  the  global  trade 
liberalisation agenda. The EU’s priority then was 
the conclusion of the Doha Development round 
which  was  launched  in  November  2001. 
                                                      
8 The ACP Group consists of 79 Member-States, all of 
them,  save  Cuba,  signatories  to  the  Cotonou 
Agreement,  a  partnership  agreement  with  the 
European  Union:  48  countries  from  Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 16 from the Caribbean and 15 from the Pacific. 
http://www.acpsec.org/en/about_us.htm 
9 Ahearn, R.J., Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements:  
Status,  Content,  and  Implications,  CRS  Report  for 
Congress, 22 March 2010, summary page. 
10 “Ministers from WTO member-countries decided at 
the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference to set up 
three new working groups: on trade and investment, 
on  competition  policy,  and  on  transparency  in 
government  procurement.  They  also  instructed  the 
WTO  Goods  Council  to  look  at  possible  ways  of 
simplifying  trade  procedures,  an  issue  sometimes 
known  as  ‘trade  facilitation’.  Because  the  Singapore 
conference  kicked  off  work  in  these  four  subjects, 
they  are  sometimes  called  the  ‘Singapore  issues’”. 
from the WTO website  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_
e/bey3_e.htm  5 
Consequently, the EU provisionally stopped the 
negotiations  of  any  new  trade  agreements  to 
focus  attention  on  the  negotiations  of  the 
Millennium Development Round of the WTO (the 
so-called Doha Round).
11 The EU thus exercised 
“a  de  facto  moratorium”  on  new  PTA 
negotiations.
12  The European Commission’s view 
then was that new bilateral negotiations would 
have weakened the EU’s position in pushing for a 
comprehensive multilateral round. 
 
In July 2006, a successful outcome of the Doha 
round  became  increasingly  unlikely  and  the 
negotiations  came  to  a  standstill.    In  October 
2006,  the  EU  announced  a  reorientation  of  its 
trade objectives and its intention to enter into 
more  bilateral  and  regional  FTAs
13  while 
reaffirming  that  concluding  a  comprehensive 
round  at  the  multilateral  level  remained  its 
priority.  
 
1.2    The “Global Europe” strategy 
 
1.2.1  Reasons behind the shift in EU trade policy 
 
Three main reasons account for the change in EU 
trade policy, which led to the definition of a new 
EU trade agenda.  
 
The first element was, as already mentioned, the 
difficulties in the multilateral negotiations within 
the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda which led 
to  negotiations  being  stalled.  Furthermore,  the 
EU failed to achieve its aim of a comprehensive 
WTO Agenda and had already allowed three of 
the  so-called  “Singapore  issues”
14 (investment, 
                                                      
11 Ahearn, R.J., Europe’s New Trade Agenda, p. 3 
12 Woolcock, S., p.2 
13 For a  detailed account of the reasons behind the 
change in the EU trade policy, please see Woolcock S. 
“European  Union  policy  towards  free  trade 
agreements”, p.3 
14 Singapore issues refer to the four subjects of trade 
and  investment,  competition  policy,  transparency  in 
competition  and  transparency  in  government 
procurement) to be dropped from the agenda in 
2003.
15 Likewise, no progress was reached in the 
services and non-agricultural market access. 
 
The second element relates to developments in 
other countries’ trade policies. In 2002, the US 
trade policy underwent a radical shift and FTAs 
emerged  as  the  centre  of  the  new  US  trade 
agenda.  Consequently  the  US  proactively 
pursued  bilateral  and  regional  FTAs  with  many 
countries  around  the  world  following  the 
‘competitive liberalization’ doctrine.
16  This new 
policy on the side of the US made it harder for 
the  EU  not  to  respond,  especially  when  high 
growth markets such as Korea were concerned.
17  
 
The third element for the EU’s shift towards the 
negotiation  of  bilateral  FTAs  “has  been  the 
burgeoning  economic  growth  in  Asia  and  the 
conclusion  of  a  range  of  FTAs  that  has 
accompanied  this  growth”.
18 The  EU  needed  to 
strengthen  its  presence  in  the  growing  Asian 
markets in particular and FTAs were employed to 
create  opportunities  for  European  companies 
abroad. More generally, the EU considered that 
                                                                                  
government  procurement  and  trade  facilitation. 
Ministers from the WTO member-countries decided at 
the  1996  Singapore  Ministerial  Conference  to  set 
working groups on these issues and since then, the 
issues  are  often  called  the  “Singapore  issues”.  For 
more details, please refer to the page of  the WTO 
website  dedicated  to  these  issues, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_
e/bey3_e.htm 
15 Woolcock, S., p.5 
16  According  to  the  “competitive  liberalization,” 
doctrine, as presented by the US Trade Representative 
R.  Zoellick,  “global,  regional  and  bilateral  trade 
negotiations  would  complement  and  reinforce  each 
other”. See quotation of R. Zoellick by Chan M. in US 
trade strategy of competitive liberalization. (“The idea 
is to create a “competition in liberalization” among US 
trading partners so that trade reform in one market 
begets similar reductions in other markets”, p.5) 
17 Woolcock, S., p.5 
18 Ibid.  6 
“if  the  existing  bilateral  agreements  supported 
the  EU’s  neighbourhood  and  development 
objectives well, its main trade interests, including 
in Asia, were less well served”.
19  It is noteworthy 
that before the EU put an end to the “de facto 
moratorium on FTAs”,
20 it was “the only leading 
power not to have engaged in FTAs in Asia”.
21 
 
1.2.2  The new EU trade agenda 
 
The new EU trade agenda was spelled out in the 
European  Commission’s  “Global  Europe” 
Communication released on 4 October 2006. This 
new  trade  strategy  aimed  to  respond  to  the 
changing  dynamics  and  geography  of 
international  trade  and  to  “set  out  the 
contribution of trade policy to stimulating growth 
and creating jobs in Europe”.
22  It was to be an 
integral part of the so-called EU Lisbon Strategy 
on growth and jobs,
23  adopted by the EU in 2000 
and which aimed to make Europe more dynamic 
and competitive.  
 
In its Communication, the Commission analyses 
the  foundations  of  the  EU’s  trade  policy  and 
competitiveness,  and  outlines  the  measures 
necessary to respond to both the EU priorities in 
terms of competitiveness and the challenges of a 
global  economy. The EU programme  comprises 
an internal and an external dimension. 
 
                                                      
19 Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Global Europe: Competing in the World, contribution 
to the EU’s growth and jobs strategy, COM (2006) 567 
final, hereafter “Global Europe” p.9  
20 Woolcock, S., p.5 
21 Sally, R., Looking East: The European Union’s New 
FTA Negotiations in Asia, ECIPE Jan Tumlir policy essay 
number 3/2007, p.5 
22 Global Europe, p. 2  
23 A summary of the Lisbon strategy can be found at 
the  following  page 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/education_tr
aining_youth/general_framework/c10241_en.htm  
While insisting on the need for the EU to adopt 
sound  internal  policies  that  allow  for  a  good 
functioning  of  the  Single  Market  and  on  the 
necessity for the EU to be open to international 
trade and investments, Global Europe develops a 
strategy  to  open  up  foreign  markets  for  the 
benefit  of  European  firms.  The  opening  up  of 
markets  in  emerging  countries  is  seen  as 
essential as these markets account for “a growing 
share of global trade”.
24 
 
Central  to  the  creation  of  opportunities  in 
emerging markets is the decision by the EU to 
launch a series of FTA negotiations with selected 
partners.  While  reaffirming  its  commitment  to 
multilateralism, the Commission announced that 
“the EU must also endeavour to promote faster 
and  more  comprehensive  trade  liberalisation 
within the framework of its bilateral relations”.
25 
The  European  Commission  proposed  a  new 
generation  of  competitiveness-driven  bilateral 
free  trade  agreements  with  key  partners,  in 
which economic criteria play a primary role. FTAs 
are  presented  as  “a  driving  force  towards 
achieving this goal”.
26  These have the advantage 
of  being  able  to  “build  on  WTO  and  other 
international rules by going further and faster in 
promoting openness and integration,  by tackling 
issues  that  are  not  ready  for  multilateral 
discussion and by preparing the ground for the 
next  level  of  multilateral  liberalization”.
27   FTAs 
may  cover  domains  that  may  not  yet  be 
addressed  multilaterally.  Furthermore,  the  EU 
wants  these  FTAs  to  better  serve  the  EU’s 
commercial interests.  
 
                                                      
24 Global Europe: Competing in the world, Summary of 
legislation, Europa website 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_tra
de/r11022_en.htm 
25 Ibid. 
26 Global Europe: Competing in the world, Summary of 
legislation  
27 Ibid., p.8  7 
To that aim, the Commission notes that the FTAs 
should have a wider scope of content than the 
existing  EU  preferential  trade  agreements  that 
were  primarily  pursuing  neighbourhood  or 
development  objectives.  Pursuing  more 
commercial interest implies that FTAs should be 
“comprehensive and ambitious in coverage”.
28  
 
First the EU insists on the need to aim at a “far-
reaching  liberalisation  of  services  and 
investment”.
29   In  particular,  the  EU  announces 
that  when  its  partners  have  signed  FTAs  with 
other countries that are competitors to the EU, it 
will at least seek full parity.
30  
 
Second, the FTAs must cov er domains that are 
not sufficiently tackled at multilateral level and 
that hamper trade and access to markets. There 
is a need to go beyond “traditional” tariff barriers 
such  as  customs  duties  and  address  other 
obstacles such as non-tariff barriers and beyond-
the-border barriers. Many obstacles to trade are 
to be found in issues linked to the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), the provision 
of services, investment, public procurement and 
the enforcement of competition rules. Therefore, 
if FTAs need to eliminate tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions,  they  should  also  contain  WTO+ 
provisions aiming at regulatory convergence. The 
domains  of  intellectual  property,  services, 
investment, public procurement and competition 
are described by the EU as “new areas of growth” 
of economic importance
31 and the EU states that 
“FTAs  should  include  stronger  provisions”  in 
these areas. The issue of regulatory barriers will 
also  be  addressed  by  the  EU  so  that  greater 
convergence  in  the  use  of  standards  can  be 
found to facilitate trade in goods, services and 
investments. The issue of Rules of Origins (RoOs) 
                                                      
28 Ibid., p.9 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p.9 
31 Ibid., p.6 
is also identified by the EU as an issue that will 
need to be addressed for the FTAs to “reflect the 
realities of globalization”
32 and in particular the 
fact that “the supply chain of many goods and 
services now encompasses factories and offices 
in various parts of the globe”.
33  
 
Furthermore, FTAs will need to consider the issue 
of  sustainable  development  by  for  example 
“incorporating  new  co-operative  provisions  in 
areas  relating  to  labour  standards  and 
environmental protection”.
34  
 
Global Europe also stresses that while FTAs will 
be based on economic criteria, they must also be 
based  on  the  EU’s  “partners’s  readiness  and 
broader political considerations”.
35  The new EU’s 
FTAs will therefore “also respond to the needs of 
each  country  in  accordance  with  the  EU's 
strategies  towards  these  countries  and  the 
regions to which they belong”.
 36 
 
To  select  its  partners  for  new  FTAs,  the  EU 
applies  economic  criteria  such  as  “market 
potential  (economic  size  and  growth)  and  the 
level  of  protection  against  EU  export  interests 
(tariffs and non-tariff barriers)”. “Based on these 
criteria, ASEAN, Korea and Mercosur emerged as 
priorities. They combine high levels of protection 
with large market potential and they are active in 
concluding  FTAs  with  EU  competitors.  India, 
Russia  and  the  Gulf  Co-operation  Council  (also 
have combinations of market potential and levels 
of protection which make them of direct interest 
to  the  EU.  China  also  meets  many  of  these 
                                                      
32 Global Europe, p.9 
33 European Commission,  Trade,  Growth  and  World 
Affairs, Trade policy as a core component of the EU’s 
2020 strategy, Discussion paper, 9 Nov 2010, p. 4 
34 Global Europe, p.9 
35 Ibid. 
36 Sally, R., p.5  8 
criteria, but requires special attention because of 
the opportunities and risks it presents”.
37  
 
1.2.3  State of play 
 
As a result of the Global Europe strategy, a series 
of  more  economically-orientated  negotiations 
was  launched  with  Korea,  India  and  ASEAN  in 
2007. The EU- Korea FTA was officially signed by 
both parties on 6 October 2010. Negotiations of 
a  ‘Comprehensive  Economic  and  Trade 
Agreement’ (CETA) were launched with Canada 
in  May  2009.  Although  Canada  was  not 
mentioned  originally  by  the  Global  Europe 
Communication, the country is considered as of 
strategic  importance  for  the  EU  industry  and 
fulfils  the  economic  criteria  defined  in  the 
Communication  for  the  selection  of  FTAs 
partners. 
 
In  addition,  a  number  of  other  types  of 
negotiations  (e.g.  Mercosur,  Gulf  Cooperation 
Council)  predating the  launch  of  Global Europe 
were  re-launched  as  “they  have  an  important 
role to play in achieving the objectives set out in 
Global  Europe”.
38  The  EU  concluded  the 
negotiations for an FTA with Columbia and Peru 
as  well  as with  Central  America  in  respectively 
March and May 2010.  
 
If the EU has engaged in the negotiations of trade 
agreements based on economic considerations, it 
has also continued negotiating with countries in 
its  neighbourhood  (the  Euromed/Eastern 
Partnership  area)  and  has  also  pursued 
negotiations  towards  Economic  Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries, “with the 
primary objective to foster development”.
39 
                                                      
37 Global Europe, p. 9 
38 European Commission, Commission Staff Working 
Document, Report on progress achieved on the Global 
Europe strategy, p.6 
39 Ibid., p. 11 
Recently, the Commission assessed in a report on 
the progress made in the implementation of the 
Global Europe strategy over the last five years.
40 
With regards to FTAs, the Commission concluded 
that  “overall,  the  FTA  negotiations  launched 
under  the  economic  criteria  defined  by  Global 
Europe have made good progress”, but “progress 
on some negotiating objectives beyond tariffs set 
out by the Global Europe strategy has been more 
mixed”.
41 
 
Building  on  the  first  achievements  in  the 
implementation  of  the  Global  Europe  strategy, 
the European Commission presented a blueprint 
of its renewed trade agenda in a discussion paper 
entitled “Trade policy as a core component of the 
EU’s 2020 strategy”.
42  An update of the EU trade 
agenda  was  felt  necessary  in  the  light  of  the 
changes in the world economy and world trade in 
order to  better  serve  the  new  competitiveness 
strategy of the EU as spelled out in the Europe 
2020 Communication.
43 
 
In this context, the Commission reaffirms that it 
will pursue its negotiating agenda both in the 
WTO and with major trading partners. FTAs, in 
particular, are seen as “a major contribution to 
the Union’s wider agenda for smart, sustainable 
and  inclusive  growth”.
44 They  should  contain 
deep commitments on issues “that will make a 
difference  in  market  access  for  services  and 
                                                      
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 12  
42 European Commission.  Trade , Growth and World 
Affairs, Trade policy as a core component of the EU’s 
2020  strategy,  Discussion  paper,  9  November  2010, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/novemb
er/tradoc_146955.pdf 
43 European  Commission,  Communication,  EUROPE 
2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, 3.3.2010 COM(2010) 2020 final  
44  De  Gucht,  K.,  Foreword  to  the  European 
Commission’s Communication, Trade policy as a core 
component of the EU’s 2020 strategy, p.2  9 
investments”,
45  such  as  public  procurement, 
competition and IPR. If these areas appear crucial 
for European businesses, they remain sensitive 
areas for many trade partners that may not be 
ready to further open their markets to foreign 
competitors. Drawing on the novelties brought in 
by  the  Lisbon  Treaty ,
46 the  Commission  also 
announces  the  negotiations  of  comprehensive 
investment provisions with some of the EU key 
trading partners. It concludes by stressing the 
need to ensure a proper enforcement of the 
agreements  already  concluded  as  “proper 
enforcement of trade rules is an important pillar 
of trade policy”.
47 
As  reiterated  by  the  European  Council  of  16 
September 2010, the objective of the EU remains 
thus  “to  secure  ambitious  FTAs,  secure  greater 
market access for European business and deepen 
regulatory  cooperation  with  major  trade 
partners”.
48 
 
 
 
                                                      
45 European  Commission,  Trade,  Growth  and  World 
Affairs, p. 4 
46 With  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty, 
investment is no longer a competence of the Member 
States but now falls under the exclusive competence 
of the EU. As  a consequence, the EU will be able to 
conclude investment treaties with its trading partners. 
For more details on the implications of the Lisbon 
Treaty on the EU trade policy, please refer to Pollet -
Fort A., “Implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU 
external  trade  policy,  EU  Centre  in  Singapore, 
Background  Brief  n°2,  March  2010, 
http://www.eucentre.sg/articles/141/downloads/Lisb
onImpactonTrade-rev6Mar.pdf 
47 European  Commission,  Trade,  Growth  and  World 
Affairs, p. 12 
48  Conclusions  of  the  European  Council  of  16 
September  2010,  as  quoted  in  the  European 
Commission  communication,  Trade,  Growth  and 
World Affairs, p. 11 
2.  THE  EU-KOREA  FTA  AS  A  BENCHMARK 
FOR  FUTURE  FTAS  CONCLUDED  BY  THE 
EU? 
 
The EU-Korea  FTA
49 is the first such agreement 
concluded by the EU with an Asian country and is 
presented as the most comprehensive free trade 
agreement negotiated by the Union. Although 
the EU stated that “its FTAs would respond to the 
needs  of  each  country  and  this  one  is  not  a 
‘blueprint’ for future FTAs”,
50 the EU-Korea FTA 
may serve as a benchmark for the on-going and 
future  EU-FTAs,  as  it  illustrates  the  level  of 
ambition the EU aims at when concluding FTAs, 
especially with countries with a similar level of 
development. 
 
2.1  The negotiation and conclusion of the EU-
Korea FTA 
 
Before  looking  into  the  key  elements  of  the 
Korean-EU FTA (KOREU FTA), it  is important to 
recall  not  only  the  offensive  and  defensive 
interests  of  both  partners  but  also  their 
respective negotiation objectives.  
The  negotiation  parties  had  different  or 
asymmetrical  offensive  interests.  While  the  EU 
has  been  aiming  at  a  deep  and  ambitious 
“WTO+”  FTA  that  gives  priority  to  the  WTO’s 
“Singapore issues”,
51 Korea has been more focus 
on the elimination of tariffs as well as the issue of 
environmental standards. 
 
 
 
                                                      
49 The complete text of the EU-Korea FTA can be found 
online  at  the  following  address: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=
443 
50 Berz,  P.,  European  Union  Free  Trade  Agreements 
Negotiations with ASEAN countries, Public lecture at 
the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 24 March 
2011 
51 See footnote 14  10 
2.1.1  The EU position 
 
  Why  Korea? 
 
The  Republic  of  Korea  (Korea)  was  the  first 
country  identified  when  applying  the  Global 
Europe  criteria  as  it  is  the  EU’s  fourth  largest 
trading  partner  outside  Europe  and  offers 
significant  growth  potential.  Its  economy  has 
grown – over the last 45 years - at an average 
rate of 7.5 percent and it has become the world’s 
13th economy. Furthermore, “as one of the most 
dynamic as well as most advanced economies in 
East Asia, Korea may provide an adequate point 
of entry into the region”.
52 
As  stated  by  the  EU,  a  FTA  with  Korea  would 
open up “a fast growing East Asian market for EU 
exports” because of the perceived dynamism of 
the Korean market.
53 The EU runs a trade deficit 
with  Korea  but  the  Korean  potential  for 
economic growth may enable the EU to expand 
its  opportunities  in  particular  in  the  sec tors 
where it already has a trade surplus such as 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, auto parts, industrial 
machinery,  shoes,  medical  equipment,  non -
ferrous metals, iron and steel, leather and fur, 
wood,  ceramics,  and  glass.
54 In  addition,  “for 
agricultural products South Korea is one of the 
more  valuable  export  markets  globally  for  EU 
farmers,  with  annual  sales  of  over  €1  billion. 
Finally in the area of services as well, the EU may 
further develop its surplus position”.
55 
                                                      
52  Nicolas,  F.,  Negotiating  a  Korea-EU  free  trade 
agreement: easier said than done, Asia-Europe Journal 
(2009) 7:23 – 42, p. 32 
53  European  Commission,  Commission  Staff  Working 
Document, Report on progress achieved on the Global 
Europe strategy, 2006-2010, p.6 
54 European Commission, EU and Korea sign free trade 
deal, 6 October 2010 
55 “In the area of services, the EU has a surplus with 
South  Korea  of    €3.4  billion,  with  exports  of  €7.8 
billion in 2008 and imports of €4.4 billion”, European 
Despite  the  seemingly  healthy  bilateral  trade 
between the EU and Korea, European companies 
have  consistently  experienced  major  trade 
barriers in the form of stringent standards and 
testing  requirements  for  EU  products  and 
services.
56 Besides,  if  “moderate  protection  still 
applies in sectors such as textiles, clothing and 
footwear, as well as the automobile sector, high 
levels of protection and low market orientation 
remain the rule in agriculture”.
57 However, Korea 
has been forthcoming in non-agricultural issues 
on  previous  FTA  negotiations  and  a  bilateral 
agreement  may  offer  the  possibility  of  deep 
regulatory cooperation.
58 
It is in the EU’s strategic interest to have better 
access to Korea’s markets “so as to increase its 
market share vis-à-vis its main competitors such 
as the US and Japan”.
59 Korea is actively pursuing 
the  conclusion  of  bilateral  FTAs.  It  is  therefore 
essential for the EU to also engage in closer trade 
relations  with  Korea  to  ensure  that  European 
companies  enjoy  the  same  level  of  benefits  in 
Korea as companies originating  from countries 
having  already  concluded  FTAs  with  Korea.  In 
that context, “the US-Korea FTA actually set the 
floor for EU-Korea negotiations and the EU could 
at  least  expect  parity  with  Korean  concessions 
made to the USA”.
60  
Nevertheless, in order to bring benefits for the 
EU, the FTA will have to be comprehensive. An 
EU-commissioned  quantitative  study
61 on  the 
KOREU FTA concluded that a full FTA where all 
                                                                                  
Commission,  EU  and  Korea  sign  free  trade  deal,  6 
October 2010 
56 Nicolas, F., p.33 
57 Ibid., p.25 
58 Sally, R., p. 24 
59 Nicolas, F., p. 33 
60 Sally, R., p.24 
61 Copenhagen Economists & François J.F., Economic 
Impact of a Potential Free Trade Area between the 
European  Union  and  South  Korea,  March  2007, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/march/tr
adoc_134017.pdf  11 
trade in goods and services would be liberalized 
would deliver appreciable gains for Korea, while 
the net effect on the EU would be rather modest. 
It  also  stressed  that  a  significant  part  of  the 
benefits  to  the  EU  will  come  from  services 
liberalization.
62  
As underlined by the authors of a qualitative 
analysis of a potential FTA between the EU and 
Korea
63  commissioned  by  the  Europe an 
Commission,  the  quantitative  studies  “do  not 
take  into  account  non-tariff  barriers”  and 
“investment  liberalization  is  not  factored  in”. 
Evidence  however  suggests  that  non-tariff 
barriers  (NTBs)  are  the  biggest  hurdles  for 
European  goods  and  services  and  that  their 
elimination  would  bring  important  benefits  for 
the  EU.  Protection  due  to  NTBs  exceeds  tariff 
protection to a large extent, especially in Korea.
64 
An  ambitious  FTA  addressing  NTBs  would 
therefore bring additional benefits to the EU. 
  The EU’s interests and negotiating position 
 
In its trade relations with Korea, the EU has both 
offensive and defensive interests.  
 
Tariffs are generally not a major issue between 
the EU and Korea, except in some isolated cases 
such as agriculture or food and beverages. 
 
In  terms  of  sectors,  the  EU’s  main  offensive 
interests  lie  in  the  chemical  industry  (including 
cosmetics  and  pharmaceutical  products), 
                                                      
62 Ibid., p. 4 
63 CEPS, A qualitative analysis of a potential free trade 
agreement  between  the  European  Union  and  South 
Korea,  November  2007, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/decemb
er/tradoc_136964.pdf 
64 CEPII/ATLAS,  The  Economic  Impact  of  the  FTA 
between  the  EU  and  Korea,  May  2010, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tra
doc_146174.pdf, p.4 
machinery industry, food products and beverages, 
as well as in services.
65 
 
In  the  manufacturing  sector,  NTBs  such  as 
specific standards, testing procedures or labeling 
requirements create difficulties for EU businesses 
to access the Korean market. European industry 
therefore called for their removal in favour of 
international  standards  and  practices.
66 In  the 
chemical  and  pharmaceutical  sectors,  the  EU 
insisted on a better protection of IPR, which is a 
particularly sensitive issue for both industries. 
Some sectors such as the automobile industry 
and  the  agriculture  are  more  sensitive.  The 
automobile sector in the EU is “the only one that 
showed some reluctance vis-à-vis a potential FTA 
with  Korea”.
67  The  gains  for  the  Korean 
producers of cars may be much more substantial 
than  for  European  carmakers  given  the  limited 
size and the relative lack of opportunities in the 
Korean  market.  In  any  event,  the  remaining 
priority for the EU automobile industry was the 
elimination of NTBs. 
In the agriculture sector, the EU’s objective was 
to  increase  its  share  in  the  pork  and  poultry 
sector. It also sought tariff reduction in a number 
of processed agricultural products. The issue of 
the  protection  of  geographical  indications  was 
also a priority for the EU in conformity with the 
Global Europe Strategy. 
In  the  services  sector,  the  EU  enjoys  a 
comparative  advantage  and  aimed  at  further 
liberalization of the Korean market, especially in 
the  banking,  financial  and  insurance  sectors 
where protection remains high. 
Finally, other issues such as various government 
interventions and  public  procurement  policy  as 
                                                      
65 CEPII/ATLASS, p. 4 
66 Nicolas, F., p.33 
67 Ibid., p.34  12 
well  as  the  further  liberalization  of  FDIs  were 
addressed by the EU. 
2.1.2  Korea’s position 
 
  The EU as an FTA partner 
 
Until  2004,  Korea  was one  of the  very  last 
countries having no FTA at all. Korea shifted 
away “from an exclusive reliance on multilateral 
trade  negotiations  towards  parallel 
bilateral/regional  FTA  initiatives”,
68  which 
became  an  established  part  of  Korea’s  trade 
policy. The new Korean trade strategy is a result 
of the 1997 financial crisis and the failure of the 
WTO negotiations. 
 
Since the establishment of the FTA Roadmap in 
2003,  Korea  has  actively  engaged  in  FTA 
negotiations  with  over  50  countries.  FTAs  with 
Chile, Singapore, the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA), ASEAN and India have entered into force. 
Korea also concluded FTAs with the US, the EU 
and Peru and is negotiating FTAs with the Gulf 
Cooperation  Council  (GCC),  Australia,  New 
Zealand, Columbia, Canada, Mexico and Turkey.
69  
 
The decision to enter into a FTA with the EU is 
also  pursuant to the new strategy by   Korea.
70 
Two main reasons can be identified for Korea’s 
choice of the EU as a FTA partner.  Firstly, the EU 
is  Korea’s  main  trading  partner  after  China.  As 
spelled out by Nicolas, concluding a FTA with the 
EU will allow Korea to get better access to “the 
highly  attractive  EU  market  because  of  its 
                                                      
68 Ibid., p.36 
69 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of 
Korea,  FTA  status  of  Korea, 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/issues
/index2.jsp 
70 Moon,  W.,  Wouters,  J .,  Corthaut  T .,  Sterkx  S ., 
Ujupan, S., EU-Korea relations and the EU-Korea Free 
Trade  Agreement,  KUL,  Leuven  Centre  for  Global 
Governance Studies, Policy Brief No. 13, March 2010, 
p. 5 
considerable size”.
71 Secondly, Korea is aiming at 
diversifying  its  trade  partners  and  “after  the 
conclusion of the KORUS FTA, the EU appears to 
be a natural complement”.
72 It will also allow for 
a diversification of Korean import sources away 
from an exclusive dependence on Japan.
73 A FTA 
with the EU will also contribute in the longer 
term  to  improve  Korea’s  competitiveness  by 
better  factor  productivity  and  by  fuelling  more 
competition into the Korean market.
74 
 
  Korea’s interests and negotiating position 
 
Korea’s  offensive  interests  lie  in  manufacturing 
sectors  such  as  textiles,  leather/clothing,  cars 
and  transport  equipment  whereas  it  is  more 
defensive  in  the  agricultural  sector  and  in  the 
service sector.
75 
In the manufacturing sector, Korea aimed at an 
“early abolition of tariffs by the EU, technological 
cooperation, as well as an easing of regulation on 
environment  and  technology”.
76  It  requested 
“the  abolition  of  the  10-22%  EU  rates  on 
automobile  imports  and  insists  on  tariffs 
elimination for electronics and textiles products. 
Korean  textiles  producers  also  wanted  to  be 
granted  the  same  treatment  as  other  textiles 
producers  originating  from  countries  with 
preferential trade agreements with the EU such 
as Morocco, Turkey or Tunisia”.
77 
In  addition,  Korea  considered  that  “the  EU’s 
RoOs are not flexible enough” and do not take 
into  account  “Korea’s  integration  in  East  Asian 
production  networks”.
78 While  the  primary  aim 
                                                      
71 Nicolas, F., p.37 
72 Ibid., p.38 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., p. 37 
75  CEPII/ATLASS,  The  economic  impact  of  the  FTA 
between the EU and Korea, p.6 
76 Nicolas, F., p. 39 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., p. 40  13 
of RoOs is to ensure that preferences accrue only 
to  the  signatories  of  a  preferential  trade 
agreement, they are often complex and can act 
as a barrier to trade.  
The  agriculture  sector  has  always  been  a 
sensitive sector for Korea. However, if both the 
rice and beef markets are particularly sensitive 
for Korean farmers, they were less of a problem 
in  relation  to  the  EU  than  during  the  KORUS 
negotiations  since  the  EU  is  neither  a  big 
producer  of  rice  nor  a  big  exporter  of  beef.  
However  the  situation  is  more  difficult 
concerning the pork and diary sectors as the EU 
is a big producer of both these products.
79 
 
On the issue of services, Korea was favourable to 
the liberalization of services and aimed at the 
opening of the EU market in sensitive sectors 
such as finance, shipping and audiovisual services.  
In  addition,  the  issue  of  standards  and  in 
particular of environmental standards is  seen by 
Korea as an important technical barrier to trade 
on the side of the EU. 
 
Although less strong than during the negotiation 
of the KORUS FTA, opposition to the KOREU FTA 
was voiced in Korea, especially in the agricultural 
sector  and  trade  unions  conc erned  about  its 
negative effect on employment. As shown by the 
2010 study on the economic impact of the FTA, 
while  positive  employment  effect  may  be 
expected for textiles, leather/clothing and cars, 
“negative  effects  may  be  expected  for  specific 
manufactured  products  (machinery,  electronic 
equipment  and  other  manufactured  products), 
specific  services  (business,  transport  and 
insurance) as well as dairy products and meat”.
80 
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between the EU and Korea, p.5 
80 Ibid., p.6 
2.1.3  Conclusion and ratification 
 
The text of the agreement was initialled between 
the European Commission and the Korea on 15 
October  2009.  On  16  September  2010  the 
Council  finally  approved  the  FTA  after  having 
found a compromise with Italy on the date of the 
provisional entry into force of the agreement.
81 
The Italian government, which feared for its car 
industry, requested an additional six months for 
the opening up of the EU market to Korean cars.  
The 27 EU Member States agreed to postpone 
the provisional implementation of the FTA until 1 
July 2011, provided the European Parliament (EP) 
would give its consent. The consent of the EP is 
required  for  the  ratification  of  all  EU  trade 
agreements  since  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Lisbon  treaty  on  1
st  December  2009.    The 
agreement was officially signed between the EU 
and Korea on 6 October 2010 on the margins of 
the EU-South Korea Summit in Brussels and the 
EP  gave  its  consent  to  the  KOREU  FTA  on  17 
February  2011.  The  EP  agreement  came  after 
negotiations  with  Seoul,  which  guarantee  that 
the  new  legislation  on  CO2  emission  limits  for 
cars  would  not  be  detrimental  to  European 
carmakers and after obtaining a safeguard clause 
to protect European automobile industry if ever 
it  would  be  threatened  by  injurious  surge  of 
imports from South Korea.
82 
 
On  the  Korean  side,  the  Korean  government 
submitted  the  KOR EU  FTA  to  the  Korean 
Assembly in October 2010. After delays in the 
                                                      
81 Despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty provides that 
trade  agreements  can  be  adopted  by  the  qualified 
majority of the member states, in practice, the Council 
of  Ministers  has  required  a  consensus  of  all  27 
member states. 
82 European  Parliament,  EU-South  Korea  free  trade 
agreement  passes  final  hurdle  in  Parliament,  17 
February 2011  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/conte
nt/20110216IPR13769/html/EU-South-Korea-free-
trade-agreement-passes-final-hurdle-in-Parliament  14 
ratification  process  due  to  political  opposition 
and  translation  errors,  the  KOREU  FTA  was 
ratified  by  the  National  Assembly  on  4  May 
2011.
83   Political opposition focused mainly on 
agriculture and services liberalisation. 
 
The  EP’s  vote  and  the  Korean  Assembly  vote 
allow for the FTA to be implemented from 1 July 
2011.  This  implementation  is  however  only 
provisional  since  the  KOREU  FTA  is  a  so-called 
mixed  agreement;  it  covers  areas  of  national 
competences  (such  as  cooperation  in  cultural 
matters  or  provisions  relating  to  the  criminal 
enforcement of IPRs) and will therefore also have 
to be ratified by the national parliaments of the 
27  member  according  to  their  own  laws  and 
procedures.
84 In the  meantime, however, most 
elements of the trade agreement would enter 
into force, whereas “elements in which only the 
individual  member  states  have  sole  or  mixed 
competence  would  enter  into  force  after 
subsequent  national  ratifications  have  been 
completed”.
85 This  process  may  take  several 
years.
86  The  completion  of  the  ratification 
procedure in each of the 27 member states will 
determine  the  definitive  application  of  the 
KOREU FTA. 
 
2.2  Key elements of the EU-Korea FTA 
 
The KOREU FTA is a comprehensive agreement
87 
that  covers  the  broad  range  of  economic 
                                                      
83 Na  Jeong-ju,  Lee  Tae-hoon,  National  Assembly 
ratifies Korea-EU FTA, The Korea Times, 4 May 2011 
84 European Commission, EU and Korea sign free trade 
deal, 6 October 2010 
85 Cooper W., Jurenas R., Platzer M., Manyin M. The 
EU  South  Korea  Free  Trade  Agreement  and  its 
implications  for  the  United  States,  CRS  Report  for 
Congress, 5 January 2011, p. 20 
86 European  Commission,  EU  Commission  welcomes 
European Parliament backing for free trade deal with 
South Korea, 17 February 2011. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=
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87 Woolcock  S.,  Assessment  of  the  EU-Republic  of 
activities  in  the  EU-South  Korean  bilateral 
economic  relationship.  It  is  organised  into  15 
chapters  and  includes  special  sector  specific 
annexes  which  cover  automotive  products, 
pharmaceuticals,  chemicals,  and  consumer 
electronics.  Once  it  enters  into  force,  it  will 
eliminate  tariffs  on  virtually  all  manufactured 
goods  in  Korea-EU  bilateral  trade  within  seven 
years  and  will  reduce  or  eliminate  most  NTBs. 
The  agreement  will  also  establish  rules  and 
procedures  in  trade  in  goods  and  services  and 
will  address  trade-related  activities  applying  to 
IPR, labour rights, and environmental protection. 
 
As it is not possible to cover all aspects of the 
KOREU FTA, only the key aspects of the FTA will 
be presented and in particular, the issues which 
are  the  most  relevant  to  Singapore  and/or 
illustrate  the  level  of  ambition  that  the  EU  is 
aiming at when concluding FTAs under the Global 
Europe strategy.
88  
2.2.1  Tariffs 
 
The KOREU FTA foresees the removal of customs 
duties  over  a  transitional  period.  When 
considering  both  industrial  and  agricultural 
products, Korea and the EU will eliminate 98.7 
percent of duties in trade value for both industry 
and  agriculture  within  5  years.  The  remaining 
portion  of  tariffs  will  be  almost  entirely 
eliminated over longer transitional periods, with 
the  exception  of  a  number  of  agricultural 
products.  
                                                                                  
Korea FTA, Presentation for the EP hearing of 23 June 
2010 
88 The KOREU FTA contains ambitious provisions on 
trade liberalisation in the agricultural sector. We have 
chosen not to detail them as this is not relevant for 
Singapore. More information can be found in Dukgeun 
Ahn, Legal and Institutional Issues of Korea-EU FTA: 
New  Model  for  Post-NAFTA  FTAs?,  Seoul  National 
University 
  15 
In terms of import value Korea will lift tariffs in 
92 percent of manufactured goods in the first 3 
years and 99 percent in 5 years time, while the 
EU  will  eliminate  93  percent  of  its  tariff  on 
manufactured goods in 3 years time and 100% 
within 5 years. 
 
The majority of customs duties on goods will be 
removed already at the entry into force of the 
agreement.  Practically  all  customs  duties  on 
industrial goods will be fully removed within the 
first 5 years once the FTA is applied. 
 
For passenger cars with small sized engines and 
consumer  electronics,  for  which  Korea  is  very 
competitive, the EU customs duties will only be 
liberalized in year 5 of the agreement. 
•  Rules of origin 
The Commission launched a process in 2005 to 
reform the rules of origin (RoOs). This need was 
also  emphasized  in  Global  Europe.  This  reform 
aims at “simpler and more modern that would 
reflect  the  realities  of  globalization”
89  since  
“vertical  integration  of  production  –  where 
components of a single product may be sourced 
in a range of countries - is replacing traditional 
trade in finished goods”.
90  
 
The changes introduced in the FTA with Korea go 
in the same direction to simplify the EU standard 
RoOs
91. In addition, the EU accepts to go to 55 
percent local value added in most manufactures. 
In sensitive sectors, a more moderate increase in 
the permissible foreign content has been agreed 
from the EU standard rule of 40 to 45 percent for 
                                                      
89 Global Europe, p. 9 
90 Commission services working doc annexed to Global 
Europe, p.4 
91 KOREU FTA,  Protocol  concerning  the  definition  of 
“originating products” and methods of administrative 
cooperation. 
cars  and  for  the  most  sensitive  consumer 
electronic items.
92  
 
Another  point  of  interest  is  the  EU’s  duty 
drawback scheme. It is the first time that the EU 
allows duty drawback in a bilateral agreement.
93 
Under  'Duty  Drawback'  (DDB)/'inward 
processing' schemes, the dutie s paid on parts 
used for the production of a final product (e.g. a 
car)  are  refunded  when  the  final  product  is 
exported.
94 The  FTA  however  also  contains  a 
possibility  of  review  of  the  clause  on  Duty 
Drawback, after 5 years from entry into force of 
the  agreement,  in  case  there  is  a  significant 
increase in foreign sourcing.
95 This could then 
result in a limitation of the duties on parts that 
can be refunded to a maximum of 5 percent.
96 
2.2.2  Non-tariff barriers 
 
One of the most important aspects of the FTA, 
however, concerns the elimination of NTBs. The 
KOREU  FTA  incorporates  fundamental  rules  on 
NTBs, such as national treatment, prohibition of 
import  and  export  restrictions,  disciplines  on 
state trading, etc. All export duties are prohibited 
from the entry into force of the agreement. The 
FTA  also  contains  separate  chapters  covering 
trade  remedies,  technical  barriers  to  trade, 
sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures  (SPS), 
customs and trade facilitation. 
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The Commission stated that the KOREU FTA is a 
good  reference  point  on  non-tariff  barriers  for 
future  agreements,  especially  where  tariffs  are 
low but significant regulatory barriers remain.
97  
  Technical barriers to trade 
More generally, the EU and Korea undertake to 
cooperate  on  standards  and  regulatory  issues 
with a view to tackle Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBTs).  TBTs  refer  to  the  use  of  the  domestic 
regulatory  process  as  a  means  of  protecting 
domestic producers. After reiterating the parties’ 
commitments  under  the  WTO  Agreement  on 
TBTs, the FTA includes specific undertakings on 
good regulatory practice such as transparency in 
making rules, use where possible of international 
standards,  providing  the  other  party  with  an 
opportunity  to  discuss  rules  before  they  are 
made, and allowing sufficient time for the other 
Party to comment on them and to take account 
of their adoption.
98 
 
In  addition,  the  FTA  includes  specific  sectoral 
disciplines  on  NTBs  to  trade.  Four  sectoral 
annexes address regulatory and other barriers in 
the areas of consumer electronics
99, automotive 
products
100, pharmaceuticals
101 and chemicals
102. 
In particular these annexes contain strong and 
precise  clauses  on  the  elimination  of  some 
selected  NTBs  such  as  safety  standards  and 
accreditation  procedures  in  automobiles  and 
electronics.  Overcoming  regulatory  barriers 
through enhanced regulatory cooperation is a 
priority for the EU, which announced in  Global 
Europe that it would play a leading role in the 
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development of global standards.
103 One way to 
achieve  this  objective  is,  according  to  the 
European Commission to “urge our main trading 
partners to join and promote the use of existing 
sectoral  regulatory  convergence  initiatives”.
104 
This was done in the KOREU FTA, which provides 
for self-declaration of conformity, the elimination 
of double testing requirements for accreditation 
but  also  for  legally  binding  commitments  to 
adopt  international  standards  in  electronics 
(safety  standards)  and  the  adoption  of 
international  standards  in  automobiles. 
According  to  the  KOREU  FTA,  UN-ECE  (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe) core 
safety  standards  for  automobiles  will  be 
considered  as  equivalent  to  Korean  domestic 
standards  from  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
agreement.
105  
 
This  new  regime  is  expected  to  bring 
considerable reduction in costs, complexities and 
bureaucratic  hassle  sin ce  cumbersome  and 
expensive  testing  and  certification  procedures 
will no longer be duplicated. 
 
For pharmaceutical products and medical devices, 
the  KOREU  FTA  specifically  provides  that  the 
South Korean authorities will introduce new rules 
to  align  their  p ractices  with  international 
standards.  In  addition,  the  KOREU  FTA  also 
introduces detailed binding rules on transparency 
regarding  decisions  on  reimbursement,  and 
stipulates the possibility that pricing decisions 
could be reviewed by a court. It also requires that 
decisions  on  reimbursement  and  pricing  be 
objective and clear. The agreement also foresees 
further  regulatory  cooperation  in  the 
pharmaceutical and medical device sector, and 
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sets  up  a  Working  Group  on  Pharmaceutical 
Products and Medical Devices.
106 
 
The  Annex  on  chemicals  highlights  the 
importance of “ensuring transparency regarding 
the  content  of  the  laws  of  both  partners  and 
regulations  and  other  measures  of  general 
application in the area of chemicals”.
107 
 
This  illustrates  that  standards  and  technical 
regulations are an  essential  element of  the  EU 
new  generation  of  FTAs  and  that  the  EU  is 
committed to negotiate with its trading partners 
the  inclusion  of  strong  and  precise  clauses  on 
standards.  The  EU  will  not  hesitate  to  enter 
deeply into the regulatory practices of its trading 
partners to tackle regulatory barriers. It will also 
“request and support relevant partner countries 
to  participate  in  specific  international 
mechanisms  and  standard-setting/regulatory 
convergence  (e.g.  ISO,  UN-ECE)”.
108  More 
generally, the issue of regulatory convergence is 
expected  to  figure  prominently  in  EU  trade 
negotiations. 
2.2.3  Other regulatory issues 
 
The  FTA  provides  for  other  far-reaching 
commitments  to  rules  governing  competition 
including  state  aid,  intellectual  property, 
enforcement and public procurement.  
  Intellectual property 
 
The  FTA  contains  a  separate  Chapter  10  on 
Intellectual  Property  rights,  which  shall 
complement  and  specify  the  rights  and 
obligations between the Parties under the WTO’s 
Trade-Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property 
Rights  (TRIPS)  Agreement  of  1994.  This 
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comprehensive  chapter  covers  provisions  on 
copyright  and  related  rights,  trademarks, 
geographical  indications,  designs,  patents  and 
plant varieties. 
A  full  section  of  the  Chapter  10  of  the  FTA  is 
devoted  to  the  mutual  recognition  and 
protection of the Geographical Indications (GIs) 
of  both  Parties.  GIs  are  a  form  of  intellectual 
property that indicates the origin of a product. 
They are very important in the EU, which has a 
rich  history  of  local  and  specialist  agricultural 
production  and  many  famous  products  closely 
linked  to  their  place  of  origin  like  Parma  ham, 
Roquefort cheese or Champagne With the Korea 
agreement,  the  EU  has  gone  beyond  the 
traditional protection of its wine and spirit names, 
and expanded to other products – beers, meat 
specialties, cheeses, olive oil, etc.
109 Around 160 
EU GIs will be protected directly with the entry 
into force of the FTA. Korea on its part protects 
teas, rice and spices. 
  Government procurement 
 
Both sides reaffirm their commitments to open 
up  government  procurement  contracts  to 
bidding  by  foreign  providers  under  the  WTO 
Government  Procurement  Agreement  (WTO 
GPA).  Korea  will  furthermore  apply  the  trade 
liberalization  provisions  to  a  larger  number  of 
public agencies than required under the GPA. The 
FTA would also offer the opportunity to expand 
procurement  opportunities  to  public  work 
concessions  and  “Built-Operate-Transfer”  (BOT) 
contracts  not  yet  covered  by  the  WTO  GPA 
commitments.  BOT  contracts  are 
“arrangements in which the private sector builds 
an  infrastructure  project,  operates  it  and 
eventually transfers ownership of the project to 
the  government  and  often  used  in  long  term 
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projects  such  as  power  plants  and  water 
treatment  facilities”.
110 The  EU  considers  this 
provision to be an important contribution of the 
agreement because these contracts not covered 
by the WTO GPA, are of significant commercial 
interest  to  European  suppliers,  who  are 
recognized  global  leaders  in  areas  such  as 
transport  equipment,  public  works  and 
utilities.
111 In Global Europe, the EU reaffirmed its 
commitment  towards  open  European 
procurement markets but also announced that it 
would  look  for  “effective  ways  of  opening  up 
major foreign procurement markets”.
112  
   Competition 
 
The Global Europe Communication also calls for 
stronger  provisions  on  competition  in  FTAs  to 
ensure that European firms do not suffer in third 
countries  from  subsidies  to  local  companies  or 
anti-competitive  practices,  which  can  have 
similar effects to more traditional trade barriers. 
The negotiation of a comprehensive competition 
chapter  covering  both  anti-trust,  subsidy  and 
transparency issues features prominently on the 
Commission's  agenda.  The  KOREU  FTA  makes 
major  advances  in  competition  policy, 
particularly  concerning  subsidies.  The  FTA 
includes  clauses  on  competition  policy,  which 
seek  to  align  the  practices  of  the  EU’s  trade 
partner to those of the EU.
113  
The FTA contains interesting and novel provisions 
on subsidies. The section on subsidies apply to 
“subsidies  for  goods  with  the  exception  of 
fisheries subsidies, subsidies related to products 
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covered  by  Annex  1  of  the  Agreement  on 
Agriculture  and  other  subsidies  covered  by  the 
Agreement on Agriculture”.
114  
An important novelty brought by the Section of 
the FTA on subsidies
115 is the obligation on both 
sides to report transparently to each other their 
respective  distribution  of  subsidies  to  their 
economies. This will prove particularly interesting 
in  the  case  of  shipbuilding  “which  has  been  a 
matter  of  concern  for  the  EU  industry”.
116 It 
provides  in  particular  that  the  parties  agree  to 
remedy  or  remove  distortions  of  competition 
caused  by  subsidies  in  so  far  as  they  affect 
international trade.  
Furthermore the section contains provisions that 
prohibit  certain  types  of  subsidies,  which  are 
considered to be particularly distortive. These are: 
a)  subsidies  covering  debts  or  liabilities  of  an 
enterprise without any limitation in law or in 
fact, as to the amount or duration; 
b) subsidies  to  ailing  enterprises,  without  a 
credible restructuring plan based on realistic 
assumptions that would allow the recipient to 
return  to  long-term  viability  without  further 
reliance on State support. The turnaround has 
to be made within a reasonable time and the 
enterprise  must  make  a  significant 
contribution to the costs of restructuring. 
The FTA’s provisions on subsidies do not cover 
the area of services.  However, the FTA provides 
that “the parties should use their best endeavour 
to  develop  rules  applicable  to  subsidies  to 
services”
117 and contains a rendez-vous clause
118 
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and decide to come back to this subject at a later date.  19 
according to which parties “agree to hold a first 
exchange on subsidies to services within 3 years 
from the entry into force of the FTA”.
119 
The  KOREU  FTA  provisions  on  subsidies  go 
beyond  the  regulation  of  subsidies  under  the 
WTO agreements and according to Jarosz-Friis, et 
al.,  constitute  “the  first  tangible  results  of  the 
EU’s  efforts  to  introduce  more  comprehensive 
disciplines on subsidies in trade agreements with 
third countries”.
120 
 
2.2.4  Services 
 
The KOREU FTA breaks new ground in the EU’s 
tradition  of  FTAs  as  it  provides  for  some  real 
achievements  in  services.    The  European 
Commission considers the KOREU FTA the most 
ambitious  services  FTA  ever  concluded  by  the 
Union.
121 It goes beyond existing commitments in 
WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). This is the case for financial services and 
telecommunications, maritime transport services 
and e-commerce. 
The KOREU FTA uses the “positive list approach” 
rather than the “negative list approach,” in laying 
out  the  schedule  of  these  commitments.  As 
explained by Cooper, Jurenas, et al., “the positive 
list requires each Party to specifically identify the 
types of services for which it will provide national 
treatment and market access to providers from 
the  other  Party”.
122 All  sectors  and  modes  not 
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specifically  mentioned  in  the  list  are  not 
liberalised. “In contrast, a negative list approach 
would  liberalise  all  sectors  and  services  except 
those explicitly stated in the agreement”.
123 The 
EU has so far always used a positive list approach 
in trade negotiations whereas the KORUS FTA, on 
the other hand, uses a negative list approach.  
Although  it  is  believed  that  a  negative  list 
approach  usually  leads  to  a  broader  and  more 
"ambitious"  market  access,  the  KOREU  FTA 
achieved  a  high  level  of  liberalization  in  the 
services  area.  Several  commentators  consider 
that the KOREU FTA “largely mirror the coverage 
found in the KORUS FTA”,
124 if not “going beyond 
what  was  achieved  by  the  KORUS  FTA”
125 
especially  in  the  telecommunications  and 
environmental services.
126 
The KOREU FTA greatly increases market access 
for  services.  On  the  EU  side,  although,  as 
underlined by Lee Jong -Kyu,  “the  EU’s  services 
market  is  already  mostly  opened”,  market 
accessibility  was  further  improved  for  Korean 
firms in the sectors of “architecture, engineering, 
urban  planning,  landscaping,  oriental  medicine, 
printing,  publishing,  telecommunications, 
construction,  finance  and  transportation”. 
However, “the EU did not open accessibility to 
medical, education and audiovisual services”.
127 
The  health  and  education  sectors  are  sensitive 
for the EU because of their public service nature. 
As for the audiovisual sector, the EU considers 
that  the  audio-visual  sector  should  not  be 
included  in  trade  liberalization  negotiations  in 
particular for the purpose of preserving cultural 
diversity.  
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On  the  Korean  side,  European  companies  will 
enjoy greater market access, particularly in the 
fields  of  satellite  broadcasting,  shipping, 
environmental  services,  financial  services  and 
legal services. 
  On telecommunications 
 
South  Korea  will  relax  foreign  ownership 
requirements,  allowing  2  years  after  the  entry 
into  force  of  the  FTA  “EU  telecommunications 
providers to own 100%. of the voting shares of 
Korean-based  providers,  except  for  the  KT 
Corporation and SL Telecom Co., for which the 
share of ownership would be limited to 49% or 
less”
128 In  addition,  EU  satellite  broadcasters 
(telephone  and  TV)  will  be  able  to  operate 
directly  cross-border  into  South  Korea,  thus 
avoiding having to liaise with a Korean operator. 
This  provision  on  international  satellite  private 
line  service  sector  goes  beyond  the  Korean 
commitments in the KORUS FTA.
129 
 
  On financial firms 
 
All EU financial firms will gain substantial market 
access to South Korea and will in particular be 
able to freely transfer data from their branches 
and affiliates to their headquarters.  
 
The FTA covers “all financial suppliers” and is not 
limited  to  “financial  institutions”  thus  allowing 
asset management services to operate in Korea, 
for example.
130 The City UK report points out that 
“the FTA will provide financial service providers 
full rights to: 
-  Establish or acquire financial service suppliers 
in  the  other  party’s  territory  to  provide  a 
complete range of financial services; 
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-  Establish  branches  of  banks,  insurance 
companies, and asset managers in the other 
party’s territory;  
-  Supply cross-border a specified list of financial 
services,  including  portfolio  management 
services  for  investment  funds,  offshore 
advisory  and  auxiliary  services  and  the 
transfer of financial data processing software 
of  financial  services  permitted  within  two 
years”.
131  
 
The  FTA  will  also  increase  the  access  to  the 
insurance market. In particular, as underlined by 
the  City  UK  report,  “the  maritime,  commercial 
aviation,  space  launch  and  freight  insurance 
markets  will  be  opened  up.  Reinsurance  and 
retrocession  will  be  permitted,  as  will  auxiliary 
insurance service, consultancy, risk assessment, 
actuarial  and  claims  settlement  services  and 
insurance intermediation services”.
132 
  On legal services  
 
The  area  of  legal  services  was  an  EU  priority 
during  the  negotiations.  The  provisions  of  the 
KOREU FTA mirrors the KORUS FTA
133 and foreign 
lawyers  will  be  allowed  to  provide  advisory 
services and employ domestic lawyers.  The legal 
market will be open in three stages. For EU law 
firms, this means that following entry of the FTA, 
they will be allowed to open law firms in Korea to 
advise  foreign  investors  or  Korean  clients  on 
international and foreign law. No later than two 
years after the entry into force of the agreement, 
EU law f irms’  representative  offices  would  be 
able “to enter into cooperative agreements with 
Korean  law  firms”
134 and  to  “fee  share  with  a 
Korean law firm, either on a project by project 
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basis  or  on  an  ongoing  basis”.
135 No  later  than 
five years after that date, EU law firms would be 
permitted  to  form  partnerships  with  Korean 
firms and will be able to employ Korean lawyers.  
 
2.2.5  Investment 
 
There  is  no  general  investment  chapter  in  the 
KOREU  FTA,  and  in  particular  no  investor-state 
dispute  settlement  procedures,  as  before  the 
entry  into  force  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  on  1st 
December 2009, investment protection was the 
responsibility  of  Member  States  through  the 
conclusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).  
 
The KOREU FTA only contains provisions on the 
liberalization of foreign direct investments (FDIs) 
and  in  particular  clauses  on  the  review  of  the 
parties’  investment  legal  frameworks.
136   The 
objective of such clauses is to assess and address 
with the other party any obstacles to investment. 
 
2.2.6  Trade and sustainable development 
 
The KOREU FTA includes provisions establishing 
shared  commitments  and  a  framework  for 
cooperation  on  trade  and  sustainable 
development.  The  EU  and  Korea  commit  to 
uphold  International  Labour  Organization  (ILO) 
core  labour  standards  as  well  as  ratify  all  ILO 
conventions  that  go  beyond  the  core  labour 
standards.  On  environment,  there  is  a 
commitment  to  effectively  implement  all 
multilateral  environment  agreements  to  which 
they are parties. 
 
In  addition,  the  EU  and  Korea  commit  to  not 
lowering the enforcement of labour standards or 
environmental standards in any way that would 
affect  trade  or  investment  between  them.  The 
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two sides will also set up both advisory groups to 
monitor  the  implementation  of  workers  rights 
and  environmental  provisions  and  a  panel  of 
independent experts to resolve issues that arise 
during its implementation.
137  
 
An interesting development is this area is the 
debate that took place around the new Korean 
draft  legislation  on  CO2  emissions  that 
introduces tougher rules on   fuel efficiency and 
CO2 emissions for cars. The EU car industry had 
expressed concerns that the new Korean on car 
emissions could be used as a non tariff barrier 
and be  detrimental to European car markers.  
The EU brought the issue with Korea that agreed 
to modify its draft legislation and, in particular, 
granted  derogations  for  car  makers  selling  a 
small number of cars in Korea.
138  
 
2.2.7  Dispute settlement 
 
The dispute settlement mechanism included in 
the FTA is based on the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding model and consists of different 
approaches for tariff and non -tariff issues. It is 
however considered to be much faster than at 
the WTO.
139  
 
In  particular,  “accelerated  procedures  are 
allowed in case of very urgent situations as well 
as in specific areas such as “motor vehicles and 
parts” or “duty drawback” sectors”.
140 For market 
access problems due to NTBs, the FTA contains a 
mediation  mechanism  “that  aims  to  find  an 
effective  solution  in  the  shortest  period 
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possible”.
141 The  mediator’s  opinion  and  the 
proposal  that  results  from  the  mediation 
mechanism  are  not  binding  on  the  parties 
involved in the conflict.  
   
3. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER EU FTAS 
IN PARTICULAR FOR THE EU-SINGAPORE FTA 
The above overview of the key provisions of the 
KOREU FTA illustrates the level of ambition that 
the  EU  is  aiming  at  when  concluding  its  new 
generation of competitiveness-driven FTAs. Even 
if  the  EU  takes  into  account  the  specificity  of 
each  trade  partner,  the  new  generation  of  EU 
FTAs  will  be  WTO+  agreements  with  an 
important regulatory content. As underlined by 
Erikson and Lee-Makiyama, “the novelties of the 
KOREU  FTA  are  not  only  important  in  bilateral 
EU- Korea trade; they will also form the basis for 
future FTA negotiations with other countries”.
142 
 
3.1 The  difficult  negotiations  of  an  EU-ASEAN 
FTA 
 
ASEAN  was  identified  in  the  Global  Europe 
communication as among the first candidates for 
the conclusion of an economically-based “WTO+” 
FTA. 
 
Following  the  EU member  states’  authorisation 
to negotiate, ‘region-to-region’ FTA negotiations 
with  a  group  of  seven  (out  of  ten)  ASEAN 
countries were launched in 2007.  
 
Despite ASEAN’s wish that all ASEAN members be 
included  in  the  negotiations,  the  Commission’s 
negotiating  mandate  only  covered  the  older 
seven ASEAN members. The mandate left out the 
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three  Least  Developed  Countries  of  ASEAN, 
although it left the door open to Cambodia and 
Laos to join the agreement in the future. The EU 
decided  not  to  negotiate  with  Myanmar  on 
principle, given its human rights record and the 
existence of EU sanctions on Myanmar.  
 
The proposed FTA “is expected to be fully WTO 
compatible (the EU as well as all ASEAN member 
states, with the exception of Laos and Myanmar, 
are  WTO  members).  The  EU  Council  gave  the 
mandate to the European Commission to pursue 
an  ambitious  and  comprehensive  agenda  while 
taking  into  account  the  different  levels  of 
development of the countries that participate in 
the FTA”.
143 The EU wants a ten-year transition 
period for tariff elimination and commitments in 
services  and  investment,  perhaps  with  longer 
transition periods for some sensitive agricultural 
products.  As  underlined  by  R.  Sally,  the  EU  “is 
willing to give Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT) to less-developed ASEAN countries in the 
form of longer transition periods, while no SDT 
was envisaged for Korea and India”.
144 Likewise in 
the area of public procurement, the EU appears 
less  ambitious  than  in  the  negotiations  with 
Korea, insisting only on greater compliance with 
WTO regulations and commitments. 
 
Ending in March 2009, nine negotiation rounds 
were held. However, progress in these region-to-
region  negotiations  was  slow,  and  both  sides 
agreed to put negotiations on hold at that time. 
ASEAN and the EU concluded that the conditions 
for a  region-to-region  FTA  did  not  yet  exist,  at 
least not at a level of ambition that the EU aims 
for.
145  As  the  Commission  concluded,  “one 
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difficulty  in  the  region-to-region  negotiations 
arose  from  significant  structural  differences 
within ASEAN, which meant that existing levels of 
liberalisation and negotiation objectives differed 
widely  among  countries  in  the  group”.
146 In 
particular,  differences  arose  on  issues  like 
government  procurement  and  intellectual 
property  rights’  (IPR)  protection.  Some  ASEAN 
members were reluctant to further adjust their 
government  procurement  to  European 
companies as requested by the EU.  In addition, 
the level of IPR protection remains weak in the 
region and most ASEAN’s members –apart from 
Singapore  -  were  not  ready  to  commit  to 
strengthening IPR enforcement. 
147 
 
However,  the  EU  decided  to  re -launch 
negotiations with ASEAN countries on a one -to-
one basis. In December 2009, EU member states 
gave the green light for the Commission to hold 
FTA negotiations with individual ASEAN countries, 
starting  with  Singapore  and  Malaysia.  The 
purpose of these bilateral FTAs is to serve as 
building blocks for the long-term objective of an 
agreement  within  the  regional  framework.  As 
stressed by the Trade Commissioner Karel De 
Gucht  recently,  the  EU’s  “ultimate  goal  of  a 
regional  EU-ASEAN  trade  agreement  remains 
valid”.
148 The Commission further insists that “by 
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aiming  for  consistency  in  each  bilateral  FTA,  a 
subsequent consolidation of bilateral deals at the 
regional  level  remains  possible  and  indeed 
desired. The objective remains, in due time, to 
‘regionalise’  the  various  bilateral  deals  into  a 
single FTA”.
149. 
 
As underlined by the EU position paper on the 
trade sustainable impact assessment of the free 
trade agreement between the EU and ASEAN,
150 
the EU still believes that “the ASEAN region holds 
out considerable potential for EU exporters and 
that it would be important to retain the ambition 
of eventually concluding free trade agreements 
with  ASEAN  countries.  Competitors  are 
increasingly gaining preferential access there and 
the  EU  risks  being  crowded  out  by  non-ASEAN 
members which have already concluded or are 
concluding  trade  agreements  with  ASEAN  (eg. 
Australia/New  Zealand,  Japan,  China,  South 
Korea and India) or by individual ASEAN member 
states (eg. Singapore's FTAs with the US, Japan or 
EFTA).  The  current  strategy,  endorsed  by  EU 
member states, is to proceed on the basis of a 
country by country approach with those ASEAN 
countries  that  show willingness  to  conclude  an 
ambitious and comprehensive bilateral FTA with 
the EU”.  
 
3.2  The EU-Singapore FTA 
 
As  emphasised  by  the  European  Commission 
Services’ annex on Singapore, “Singapore holds a 
unique  position  amongst  ASEAN  countries  as  a 
developed  industrial  economy  with  a  highly 
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educated population”
151 and “an economy that is, 
in  terms of  GDP  per  capita,  on  equal  with  the 
EU”.
152  It  is  the  “EU’s  foremost  trade  and 
investment  partner  in  South  East  Asian 
countries”
153 and as such is an ideal candidate for 
the conclusion of a deep ’WTO+’ FTA. 
 
3.2.1  Overview  of  EU-Singapore  trade  and 
investment relations 
 
The brochure of the EU delegation to Singapore 
on EU Singapore Trade and Investment 2011
154 
gives the following overview of trade relations 
between the two countries. 
  Trade in goods 
The  EU  is  Singapore’s  second  largest  trading 
partner behind Malaysia and ahead of China and 
the US. The EU is Singapore’s largest supplier and 
Singapore’s  fourth  export  market.  The  2011 
brochure  recalls  that  “EU  trade  is  highly 
concentrated in certain key product groups” and 
in  particular,  the  machinery  and  transport 
equipments,  chemicals  and  miscellaneous 
manufactured goods.
155 
Singapore is the EU’s number one trading partner 
within ASEAN and the EU’s 12
th largest trading 
partner.  It  represents  the  EU’s  largest  export 
market  categories  Southeast  Asia  with  1.8%  of 
the EU’s total exports. Singapore’s exports to the 
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EU  are  concentrated  in  the  machinery  and 
transport  equipment  sector  and  the  chemical 
sector.  In  2010,  these  two  sectors  combined 
“represented  more  than  70%  of  Singapore’s 
exports to the EU”.
156 
After a decline in trade between the   EU and 
Singapore as a result of the global financial and 
economic crisis in 2008-2009, in 2010, the trade 
flow levels are now back to the levels reached in 
the pre-crisis period. In particular, according to 
Eurostat and as reported in the 2011 brochure, 
the  EU -Singapore  overall  merchandise  trade 
increased by 22% from its 2009 level. “Over the 
last five years the EU-Singapore’s total external 
trade increased by 9.4%”.
157 
As  already  stated  in  the  EU  delegation  2010 
brochure, “the growth in EU-Singapore trade can 
be largely attributed to the role of Singapore as a 
trading  hub  in  South-East  Asia.  The  strategic 
position  of  Singapore  is  becoming  increasingly 
attractive for its trading partners such as the EU. 
Its gateway position has also made Singapore the 
EU’s number one trading partner in ASEAN and 
the  EU’s  largest  export  market  in  South-East 
Asia”.
158 
  Trade in services 
The 2011 brochure states that “trade in services 
between the EU and Singapore is growing at a 
steady rate”. Today, the EU is Singapore’s largest 
trading partner in services while Singapore is the 
EU’s eight largest trading partner in services. 
As  far  as  sectors  are  concerned,  “according  to 
SingStat,  transportation,  business  related  and 
communication  services  account  for  72.3%  of 
Singapore’s  exports  to  the  EU  and  57%  of  its 
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imports.  However,  it  is  royalties  that  had  the 
largest  share  (30.8%)  in  Singapore’s  imported 
services from the EU”.
 159 
  Foreign direct investment 
The EU is the most significant source of FDI (30%) 
in Singapore ahead of the US (10.5%) and Japan 
(9.7%).  Over  the  last  10  years,  “the  most 
important  sectors  for  EU  FDI  in  Singapore  are 
manufacturing,  and  financial  and  insurance 
services. Over 8,500 EU companies are present in 
Singapore”.
160 The  2011  brochure  notes  that 
“despite  the  intensifying  competition  for  FDI 
among Asian countries, Singapore is the largest 
Asian  destination  for  EU  FDI  outflows  to  Asia, 
ahead of Hong Kong, Japan, and Mainland China”. 
In  addition,  “Singapore  is  among  the  biggest 
external investors in the EU”. Out of all Asian FDI 
stock to the EU it “ranks second with a share of 
16.5%, after Japan, with a share of 44.4%”. “The 
vast majority of Singapore’s FDI within the EU is 
in  the  financial  and  insurance  services  and  the 
manufacturing sectors, followed by information 
and communications, wholesale and retail trade, 
and finally, hotel and restaurant services”.
161 
As  underlined  by  the  EU  Ambassador  to 
Singapore, the strong trade ties between the EU 
and Singapore “provides *the EU and Singapore+ 
with a solid basis to make another step forward 
with the expected Free Trade Agreement”.
162 
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3.2.2  The  arguments  in  favour  of  an  EU 
Singapore FTA 
 
  The EU position 
 
Singapore appears as an ideal FTA partner for the 
EU for several reasons. 
 
First, as shown by the data on the EU-Singapore 
trade  and  investment  relations,  the  EU  has  a 
major economic stake in Singapore. Singapore is 
by far the EU’s largest ASEAN trade partner, and 
is  considered  to  be  one  of  the  most  business 
friendly country.
163  
 
Second, Singapore is a gateway to the region and 
is the location of regional headquarters of many 
European  companies.  Already  today  European 
companies  in  many  sectors  have  chosen 
Singapore as a hub from which to serve the Asia-
Pacific region, and the FTA would seek to create 
additional trade and investment opportunities.  
 
Third,  as  underlined  by  the  European 
Commission,  “Singapore’s  experience  in  FTA 
negotiations  and  its  record  in  concluding 
ambitious  agreements  with  developed 
economies  like  the  US  and  Japan  indicate  that 
the  EU  could  aspire  to  negotiate  a 
comprehensive  and  ambitious  FTA  with 
Singapore”.
164 An  EU-Singapore  FTA  would  also 
put an end to the discrimination suffered by EU 
companies as a result of the preferential market 
access  granted  to  their  competitors  originating 
from  existing  FTA  partners  of  Singapore.  As 
stressed by the European Chamber of Commerce 
(EuroCham)  in  Singapore,  “with  each  new  FTA 
the benefits for those who are in diminish, and 
the  disadvantages  for  those  who  are  out 
increase”. Therefore a FTA with Singapore would 
“eliminate  disadvantages  for  EU  companies  in 
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Singapore resulting from other FTA's notably the 
US-SIN FTA”.
165  
 
Finally,  the  fact  that  Singapore  is  not  a  major 
exporter  in  the  politically  sensitive  sectors  of 
agriculture,  textiles,  apparels  and  steel  also 
means that the EU may aim at a relatively quick 
and unproblematic FTA conclusion. 
 
In view of the above, the EU, when negotiating 
the FTA with Singapore, has taken as benchmarks 
both the results achieved in the KOREU FTA in 
the tariffs, services and regulatory areas and the 
commitments  given  by  Singapore  to  its  other 
FTAs partners. 
 
The EU has also made clear that “the merit of 
FTA negotiations with Singapore lies as much in 
the intrinsic commercial benefit of such a deal, as 
in  the  systemic  value  of  establishing  a  good 
precedent for future FTAs, and in particular with 
future ASEAN FTAs”.
166 As underlined by one of 
the EU trade negotiators, “there may not be too 
many  trade  irritants  with  Singapore,  but  this 
agreement will become an important reference 
for other agreements with ASEAN states”.
167 
 
In  negotiating  a  FTA  with  Singapore,  the  EU 
therefore  pursues  a  double  objective:  further 
improving the access to the Singaporean market 
for EU companies, and setting the scene for EU’s 
activities with ASEAN. 
 
  The Singapore position 
 
As already underlined, Singapore’s economy, in 
terms  of  international  trade  and  foreign 
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investment remains one of the “most open, and 
thus  competitive,  in  the  world.  With  a  few 
exceptions,  tariffs  are  zero,  total  merchandise 
trade  is  nearly  four  times  GDP  and  inflows  of 
foreign direct investment are substantial”.
168  
 
The  2007  overview  of  Singapore’s  trade  policy 
conducted  by  the  WTO  Secretariat  concludes 
that “Singapore views the WTO as at the core of 
its trade policy strategy but also considers that 
trade liberalization efforts undertaken bilaterally 
and  regionally  can  accelerate  the  momentum 
towards  trade  liberalization  and  thus  form 
building  blocks  for  the  multilateral  trading 
system”.
169 The  WTO  Secretariat  recalls  that 
Singapore “participates in ASEAN and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) and 
has  also  bilateral  trade  and  investment 
agreements with various countries in the world.”  
 
According to the Singaporean Ministry for Trade 
and Industry, Singapore’s network of FTAs cover 
18  regional  and  bilateral  FTAs  with  24  trading 
partners. Singapore has concluded both bilateral 
and regional FTAs. The following FTAs are already 
in force: ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN-
Australia-New  Zealand  FTA  (AANZFTA),  ASEAN-
China  FTA  (ACFTA),  ASEAN-India  FTA  (AIFTA), 
ASEAN-Japan  FTA  (AJCEP),  ASEAN-Korea  FTA 
(AKFTA),  Singapore-Australia  FTA  (SAFTA), 
Singapore-China FTA (CSFTA), Singapore -Jordan 
FTA  (SJFTA),  Singapore-India  FTA  (CECA), 
Singapore-Japan  Economic  Partnership 
Agreement (JSEPA), Singapore-Korea FTA (KSFTA), 
Singapore-New  Zealand  FTA  (ANZSCEP), 
Singapore-Panama  FTA  (PSFTA),  Singapore-Peru 
FTA  (PeSFTA),  Singapore-EFTA  FTA  (ESFTA), 
Transpacific  SEP  (Brunei,  New  Zealand,  Chile, 
Singapore),  Singapore-United  States  FTA 
(USSFTA). 
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FTAs with the Gulf Cooperation Council and with 
Costa Rica were concluded but are not yet into 
force. Singapore is currently in FTA negotiations 
with Canada, Mexico, Pakistan, Ukraine and the 
EU.
170 
 
Looking at the content and scope of Singapore 
FTAs, the WTO Secretariat concluded that “while 
Singapore  has  almost  no  applied  tariffs,  it  has 
offered  to  negotiate  preferential  treatment  for 
partners, ranging from binding all its tariff lines at 
zero  and  open  access  to  service  industries  in 
Singapore,  to  regulatory  issues  such  as  mutual 
recognition  of  standards,  enhanced  investment 
protection  disciplines,  greater  commitment  to 
protect IPRs and elimination of anticompetitive 
practices”.
171 
 
The  WTO  Secretariat’s  overview  noted  that 
“Singapore’s import restrictions are based mainly 
on  environmental,  health  and  public  security 
concerns” and that “Singapore makes very little 
use of trade defence instruments such as anti-
dumping  measures  and  has  no  legislation  on 
safeguards”.  As  general  policy,  Singapore  uses 
international  standards  where  available.  The 
WTO Secretariat concludes that “regarding public 
procurement,  Singapore  provides  additional 
market concessions for its trading partners under 
most of its bilateral FTAs”.
172 
 
In  view  of  Singapore’s  FTA  policy  and  the 
importance  of  the  EU  as  a  trade  partner, 
concluding a FTA with the EU would be a natural 
complement  to  the  network  of  FTAs  already 
concluded  by  Singapore.    An  FTA  with  the  EU 
would further enhance its trade and investment 
links with the world’s largest trading entity and 
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the access to one of the most lucrative consumer 
market of 501 million people. 
 
The impact of a FTA with the EU on Singapore’s 
economy and its sectors has been looked at in a 
study  commissioned  by  the  European 
Commission.
173 Although the study looks at the 
effect of a potential EU -ASEAN FTA, its findings 
on Singapore are considered by the European 
Commission to remain valid, in particular as the 
EU-Singapore  FTA  is  meant  to  be  a  further 
element of an EU-ASEAN FTA.
174  
 
The  study  concludes  that  “in  absolute  terms, 
Singapore  stands  to  gain  most  substantially  in 
terms of increased trade flows, consolidating its 
position  as  a  regional  trading,  sourcing  and 
distribution hub and financial centre”.
175 
 
As  Singapore  is  a  service economy,  it  is  in  the 
services  sector  that  “Singapore  stands  to  gain 
more  in  percentage  terms,  especially  in  the 
insurance  sector  and  the  financial  services 
sector”.
176  
 
Finally,  “investments  and  the  reallocation  of 
capital  are  considered  to  be  “the  main  drivers 
behind the long run dynamic efficiency gains”
177 
from an EU Singapore FTA. 
 
3.2.3  Possible  contentious  issues  in  the  EU-
Singapore FTA  
 
As underlined by the Annex on Singapore to the 
Position Paper, “it would not seem unreasonable 
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to expect that overall, negotiations in the three 
main negotiating areas – tariffs, services and the 
regulatory  issues  (such  as  intellectual  property, 
government  procurement,  regulatory 
transparency,  sustainable  development, 
competition and dispute settlement) will lead to 
ambitious results”. It is therefore very likely that 
the  EU  Singapore  FTA  will  follow  the  same 
structure  as  the  KOREU  FTA  and  in  particular 
contain  ambitious  provisions  similar  to  the 
KOREU FTA. The EU is aiming at a “WTO+” FTA 
that  would  at  least  create  a  level  playing  field 
with other companies on the ground and ensure 
that regulatory issues are properly addressed.  
 
  Tariffs 
 
Along  the  line  of  the  KOREU  FTA,  the  future 
EUSFTA  may  certainly  lead  to  an  extensive 
elimination  of  tariffs  on  industrial  and 
agricultural goods. The EU has announced that its 
FTAs  aim  at very  large  tariff  reduction. On  the 
side of  Singapore,  this may  not  be an  issue  as 
Singapore  already  has  zero  tariffs  on  a  great 
range  of  goods  and  has  granted  generous 
concessions to its existing FTAs partners. The EU 
is expected to abolish tariffs in a similar way as it 
did with Korea. 
 
The most challenging area however regarding the 
tariff  chapter  is  perhaps  the  issue  of  Rules  of 
Origin  (RoOs).
178 According  to  commentators, 
that  fact  that  most  manufacturers  located  in 
Singapore  operate  in  the  basis  of  scale 
production  “raised  concerns  about  opening  a 
backdoor  for  Chinese  products”.
179 It  will  be 
interesting  to  see  how  the  outcome  of  the  EU 
Singapore  FTA  negotiations  will  compare  in 
relation  to  the  KOREU  FTA,  which  showed  an 
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increase  of  the  foreign  content  percentage 
authorized  by  the  EU  to  qualify  for  the  FTA 
favourable treatment.  The increased flexibility in 
the EU’s RoOs will be critical for Singapore as a 
global  manufacturer.  The  issue  of  taking  into 
account the  global value chains is essential for 
many  Asian  countries,  and  as  Pascal Lamy,  the 
Director-General of the WTO recently put it, “the 
questions of who produces what and where the 
value added is accruing are perhaps as important 
as  the  traditional  concept  of  country  of  origin 
*…+”.
180 
 
  Regulatory issues 
 
The EU Singapore FTA is expected to go deep and 
to address ‘behind the border’ issues, to secure a 
safe and fair regulatory environment. In this area, 
the outcome of EU Singapore FTA is expected to 
be similar to what was achieved in the KOREU 
FTA in particular on the issue of standards and 
certification.  In  particular,  in  addition  to  good 
regulatory  practices,  cooperation  on  standards 
and transparency provisions, “it will include also 
sectoral  annexes  on  technical  barriers  to  trade 
(cars,  electronics  and  pharmaceuticals)  as  the 
KOREU FTA”.
181  
 
  IPRs 
Likewise, in area of IPRs, the EU is aiming at a 
similar quality of agreement as with Korea. There 
will  definitely  be  a  chapter  on  Geographical 
Indications as this is a priority of the EU. If the 
protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  might 
not be a difficult issue at first sight in Singapore, 
ensuring a good enforcement of these rights is 
essential in view of the many goods that transit 
through  Singapore  from  other  countries. 
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Furthermore,  the  issue  of  IPRs  is  more 
problematic in other ASEAN countries and in this 
area  also,  the  EU-Singapore  FTA  will  play  an 
important  role  in  setting  scene  for  the 
negotiations of future bilateral FTAs between the 
EU and other ASEAN states. 
  Competition 
Likewise,  the  EU  Singapore  FTA  will  include  a 
competition  chapter  covering  both  anti-trust, 
subsidy  and  transparency  issues  in  the 
competition field. In 2004, Singapore introduced 
a  competition  law  and  created  a  competition 
commission  and  it  is  expected  that  in  the 
framework of the FTA, dialogue and cooperation 
could be enhanced on competition policy issues, 
in  particular  on  the  issue  of  government 
monopolies and subsidies.  
  Public procurement 
The area of public procurements is also a priority 
of the EU and a further opening up of access to 
Singapore public procurements along the line of 
the  KOREU  FTA  may  be  expected.  Public 
procurements  constitute  an  important  part  of 
Singapore’s  GDP.  The  EU  therefore  aims  at 
getting  a  better  access  to  this  area  of 
opportunities for European companies. 
  Services 
Under  an  FTA,  the  most  important  sector 
affected, both in the EU and Singapore, will be 
the services sector and in particular financial and 
professional  services.  On the  EU  side,  trade-in-
services would appear to be a sector where the 
EU  could  potentially  benefit  from  an  FTA  with 
Singapore.  In  particular,  even  if  the  Singapore 
market is relatively open, European firms are put 
in a less advantageous position than companies 
originating  from  countries  such  as  the  US, 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  that  already 
concluded FTAs covering services with Singapore. 
An EUSFTA would help address this imbalance. 
This is why in the area of services, the EU will aim 
at a high degree of liberalization and at least the 
same  commitments  as  the  ones  obtained  by 
other FTA partners of Singapore. It is in particular 
expected that the EU will seek improved market 
access for services including financial, legal and 
environmental. 
The  European  services  industry  has  declared 
itself  “strongly  in  favour  of  a  free  trade 
agreement with Singapore, which can serve as an 
ambitious  benchmark  for  future  agreements  in 
the region”.
182 It has pronounced itself in favour 
of the use of the negative list approach in the 
services  negotiations  with  Singapore.  It  also 
called for the removal of all equity caps that may 
remain  in  Singapore,  the  removal  of  all 
nationality  and  residency  requirements  for 
members  of  executive  boards  of  branches, 
subsidiaries and joint-ventures.
183 
In particular, the EU will likely insist on getting 
the same treatment as US banks. Under  the US-
Singapore FTA, US banks can establish as many 
branches as a local Singaporean bank while other 
“foreign  full  banks”  may  not  increase  their 
number of places of business without approval of 
the  Monetary  Authority  of  Singapore”.  In 
addition, “they may only establish to up to a total 
of 25 branches and offsite ATMs”.
184  
In the insurance sector also, restrictions apply to 
the operation of European insurance companies. 
As mentioned by the European Services Forum, 
“market  access  for  European  insurances  is  still 
limited by foreign equity cap of 49%”. In addition, 
EU insurance companies are not free to establish 
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new subsidiaries and branches or to participate 
in joint ventures.
185  
Access to the postal services market is may also 
be an area where negotiations may  be difficult. 
Likewise,  the  issue  of  the  recognition  of 
education  diplomas  and  qualifications  in 
professional services will likely be an important 
area of negotiations. The sectors of architectural 
and  legal  services  have  been  identified  as 
problematic. 
As Singapore is “essentially a services economy, 
it  would  also  greatly  benefit  from  a  further 
opening of the services market in the EU and is 
said  to  have  sent  an  ambitious  request  to  the 
EU”.
186 One issue in relation to the EU financial 
services  sector  was  highlighted  by  the  impact 
assessment study commissioned by the European 
Commission,    that  is,  “the  absence  of 
convergence in regulation among member states 
including accounting standards and differences in 
the implementation of the Basle-II framework for 
banks,  as  well  as  different  regulatory 
requirements  for  banking  and  other  financial 
services.
187 The study qualified it as “a major non-
tariff barrier”.
188  
  Investment 
As already mentioned, the EU has since the entry 
into  force  of  the  Lisbon  treaty  an  exclusive 
competence in both the area of market access 
liberalisation  and  investment  protection.  The 
original  negotiation  mandate  did  not  include 
investment  protection  but  the  EU  Commission 
services  stated  that  the  Commission  has 
requested  to  the  Council  an  extension  of  the 
negotiation  mandate  relating  to  investment 
protection  and  expect  the  Council  to  take  a 
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decision  shortly.
189  This  would  allow  the 
Commission  to  negotiate  with  Singapore  a 
chapter on investment covering both areas of 
market  access  liberalisation  and  i nvestment 
protection.  
  Sustainable development 
As in the KOREU FTA, the future EU Singapore 
FTA  will  contain  a  chapter  on  sustainable 
development  covering  commitments  on  both 
high  labour  standards  and  environmental 
standards. Although Singapore has signed up to 
the  core  ILO  conventions  and  has  ratified  the 
major conventions  in  the  area of environment, 
the  European  Commission  underlined  the 
importance to include in the FTA  measures to 
promote high levels of labour and environmental 
standards, “not only for Singapore itself but as an 
important example for future bilateral FTA”.
190  
The  European  Chamber  of  Commerce  in 
Singapore  mentioned  the  issue  of 
environmental  standards  as  one  area  of 
concern  and  said  that  negotiations  should 
“aim  for  Singapore  to  adopt  the  EU 
environmental  standards  and  industry 
standards on sustainability”.
191 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
According to a recent statement by the EU chief 
negotiator,  “the  EU-Singapore  Free  Trade 
Agreement discussions is anticipated to conclude 
over  the  next  few  months  and  will  come  into 
effect  by  the  second-  half  of  2012”.
192 The 
                                                      
189 European  Commission,  Directorate  General  for 
Trade,  Civil  Society  Meeting,  Bilateral  Trade 
Negotiations: state of play, 9 February 2011 
190 European Commission, Annex one, p. 4 
191 EuroCham, EU-Singapore FTA, a business primer 
192 Shamsiah Tengku Abdullah, TN, “EU-Singapore set 
to complete FTA negotiations, says Chief negotiator”, 
Bernama, 8 June 2011:  31 
negotiations are going well and are on track, with 
“the  chapters  on  tariffs  and  regulatory  aspects 
are  making  significant  progress”.
193  Difficult 
issues however still lie ahead, especially on the 
issues  of  “rules  of  origin,  procurement  and 
technical norms”.
194  
In addition, the EU and Singapore will also need 
to conclude the negotiations of a Partnership and 
Cooperation  Agreement  (PCA).  PCAs  are 
comprehensive  agreements  providing  the  legal 
basis  for  both  parties  to  cooperate  in  a  wide 
range of economic and non-economic areas and 
provide the strategic framework for cooperation 
between  two  partners.  In  particular,  PCAs 
normally  include  significant  political  clauses, 
including  the  respect  for democratic  principles, 
fundamental human rights and the principle of 
the rule of law.  
As  recalled  recently  by  the  EU  Trade 
Commissioner Karel De Gucht, “before entering 
into  FTA  talks  with  any  country,  the  EU  first 
insists  on  a  Partnership  and  Cooperation 
Agreement”.
195 Negotiations of the EU-Singapore 
PCA  were  launched  back  in  2004  but  the 
negotiations  still  need  to  be  “wrapped  up”  as 
told by the EU ambassador to Singapore.
196  
The conclusion of both agreements will lead to a 
further  e nhancement  of  the  EU -Singapore 
partnership. The EU Singapore FTA, in particular, 
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193 European  Commission,  Directorate  General  for 
Trade,  Civil  Society  Meeting,  Bilateral  Trade 
Negotiations: state of play, 9 February 2011 
194 Shamsiah Tengku Abdullah, TN, EU -Singapore set 
to complete FTA negotiations, says Chief negotiator 
195 Reuters, EU expects to agree Singapore FTA this 
year, more in 2012, 8 June 2011, 
http://singaporebusiness.asia/eu-expects-to-agree-
singapore-fta-this-year-more-in-2012/ 
196 Lee U-W., “S’pore EU free trade pact likely in next 
few months”, The Straits Times, 
http://www.eucentre.sg/details.php?i=35 
will be an important achievement for the trade 
and investment relations between both partners 
and is presented by the EU Chief Negotiator as 
“the most comprehensive and advance for both 
parties”.
197   It  will  further  provide  a  “valuable 
point  of  reference  also  for  other  FTA 
negotiations”,  especially  for  agreements  with 
other ASEAN members.
198 As emphasized by the 
Commission, “the merit of FTA negotiations with 
Singapore  lies  as  much  in  the  intrinsic 
commercial  benefit  of  such  a  deal,  as  in  the 
systemic value of establishing a good precedent 
of  what  a  comprehensive  21st  century  FTA 
should  look  like”.
199 The  EU-Singapore  FTA  is 
therefore  critical  for  both  the  trade  and 
investment  relations  between  the  EU  and 
Singapore  as  well  as  for  future  trade  relations 
with ASEAN as a whole. 
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